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THE INFLUENCE OF GENDER DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE
LA INFLUENCIA DE LA DIVERSIDAD DE GÉNERO EN EL RENDIMIENTO EMPRESARIAL
ABSTRACT
This work focuses on the effect of gender diversity on corporate performance. The current work, an
extension of previous studies, focuses on the presence and effect of female stockholders, directors and top
managers by analysing their impact on various accounting ratios, market value and technical efficiency. 
With a view to testing these hypotheses, we selected Spanish corporations that were listed on
the Madrid Stock Exchange over the period 2004-2006 as an objective population. Corporate
governance information on these companies is available from the CNMV database. Our
findings show that companies with higher levels of gender diversity do not obviously
outperform other companies with lower levels, in terms of several market and accounting
measures. Therefore, gender diversity may not influence corporate performance.  
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RESUMEN
Este trabajo se centra en analizar el efecto de la diversidad de género en el rendimiento
empresarial. El trabajo que se presenta, como extensión de estudios anteriores, se centra en
analizar la influencia que tiene la presencia de mujeres accionistas, directivas y altos cargos
en los Consejos de Administración de las empresas, así como en analizar el impacto que tiene
dicha presencia en el rendimiento empresarial, tomando como variables representativas de
dicho rendimiento medidas contables, de valor de mercado y de eficiencia técnica.
Con la finalidad de testar las hipótesis planteadas, se han seleccionado las empresas
españolas que cotizaban en la Bolsa de Madrid durante el período 2004-2006, constituyendo
el período objeto de estudio. La información sobre gobierno corporativo se ha obtenido de la
base de datos disponible en la Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores. Los resultados
obtenidos muestran que las empresas con mayores niveles de diversidad de género no superan
a otras empresas con niveles más bajos, en términos de medidas contables y de mercado y en
definitiva, la diversidad de género parece no influir en el rendimiento empresarial.
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INTRODUCTION
An important issue, which generates widespread interest and a degree of controversy in the
debate over corporate governance, has to do with diversity, defined as the range of ethnic
and gender representation on boards of directors (Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003, p.
103). However, ethnic groups are not generalized across all countries; which is the reason
why women play a very important role in this sense: for example, the Higgs Report (2003)
stresses the importance of incorporating women onto boards of directors, especially when
there is little or no female representation.
This legal requirement to increase the presence of female directors is in response to their
low average numbers on the boards of European corporations, even though it has increased
over recent years (Heidrick and Struggles, 2007). Nevertheless, the level of diversity
varies from country to country (Carrasco Gallego and Laffarga Briones, 2006; Campbell
and Minguez-Vera, 2008a; De Luis et al., 2008).
Spanish politicians have been especially active in this context, by issuing a Unified Code
of Good Governance and undertaking a legislative review with the aim of promoting gender
diversity in labour environments. This normative context has reawakened interest in the
relationship between gender diversity and corporate performance, because of the
controversial nature of the topic, among other things. Although it may be socially and
ethically correct to achieve a balanced presence of both genders on boards and in top
management, it is widely noted that gender diversity does not necessarily lead to greater
returns. Previous research has actually produced mixed results, given that the link
between gender diversity and financial performance in a firm is both theoretically and
empirically complex (Carter et al., 2007, p. 4).
Based on the timeliness and the current interest of the topic, we have analysed the real
impact of gender diversity on corporate performance, in line with some of the main topics
in the field such as independence, etc. Thus, this study focuses on the impact of the
percentage of women on boards and in top management, and the percentage of female
stockholders with significant shares in stock ownership, by using several measures of
corporate returns, efficiency and market value. 
Therefore, the current work enlarges on previous evidence regarding the influence of gender
diversity on performance by analysing diversity at different levels of decision-making within
the firm, and by studying its impact on a broader set of accounting and market variables, in
the context of a political commitment to increasing the presence of female managers in
companies. Hence, this work encompasses a wider perspective in the study of female
representation, compared to previous studies, which have usually focused on one category of
female presence (director, manager or entrepreneur). It also extends the previous literature,
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by analysing the impact on a wide range of corporate variables, such as accounting measures
(margins and returns), market values and efficiency. The study is undertaken in a normative
and regulatory context of strong political pressure to increase the participation of women in
companies. Formerly, a country with one of the lowest percentage rates of female presence on
boards, Spain has increased the pressure to facilitate their incorporation into top managerial
positions. By combining the special features of the Spanish context and the variables under
analysis, we can gain insight into the study of gender diversity. This research describes and
analyses the situation before the normative changes undertaken in 2007. It is foreseeable that
this situation may change in the years ahead, following their enactment into law and after the
progressive incorporation of women into the most relevant positions in corporate governance,
which should be analysed in the future. 
However, we should emphasize that the study over the period 2004-2006 attempts to
determine –without bias– whether a link of some sort exists between higher gender
diversity and better corporate performance, so that increased gender diversity in the
business field may be justified from a strictly economic perspective.
The absence of bias is derived from the fact that women who occupied senior positions
throughout 2004-2006 were selected as a consequence of their education, training and
professional experience. These features cannot be individually observed with data from 2007
and subsequent years, because, in addition to the effectiveness of gender diversity, it will
reflect the presence of females in these positions in order to comply with legal requirements. 
After performing a broad descriptive analysis and testing for differences of means, we
applied panel data methodologies to estimate different models, with and without
instrumental variables, in order to correct endogeneity problems. The findings obtained for
our Spanish sample -96 firms observed during the period 2004 to 2006- suggest a non-
significant or even a rather negative effect for gender diversity on corporate performance,
in line with several previous studies. Therefore, our findings show no evidence for
differences in corporate performance as a function of gender diversity. 
Our results are especially significant in the current normative context in Spain, where
political intervention is active to increase female presence in companies and an attempt is
being made to reach labour parity between the two genders. However, as our findings
suggest that this kind of diversity does not necessarily lead to greater corporate
performance, a balanced presence of both genders in top decision-making bodies may
perhaps be more easily explained from a sociological , rather than  a strictly economic
perspective. 
This study is organized as follows: section 2 describes current normative changes which
are intended to increase the presence of women within companies; section 3 analyzes and
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summarizes the main theories and previous empirical evidence on the impact of diversity
on corporate performance; section 4 describes our research methodology; and in section 5
we report on the empirical results, which are discussed in section 6, prior to setting out
our conclusions in section 7.
TOWARDS INCREASED GENDER DIVERSITY IN SPAIN: RECENT
NORMATIVE CHANGES
Significant political interventionism is a recent outcome that may be motivated by the
advantages that ensue from greater gender diversity, or by the aim of removing the barriers
to promotion to top corporate positions that females have to face. 
On the one hand, in relation to non-compulsory recommendations and guidance, each
country has developed its own corporate governance code. Although these codes are
structured in different ways, they encompass the set of relations between company
management, the board of directors, the stockholders and other stakeholders (Carrasco
Gallego and Laffarga Briones, 2006). Considered of vital importance, gender diversity is
an issue in corporate governance codes across the world (Rose, 2007, p. 404). Along these
lines, Robinson and Dechant (1997) believe that corporations in which top management is
formed by people from both genders will promote creativity and corporate innovation,
because they will draw on different skills, experience and knowledge. 
As in other countries, in Spain, the Unified Code of Good Governance, drawn up by the
CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores or Securities Markets Commission) and
approved in 2006, explicitly mentions the need for adequate gender diversity on boards.
According to this code, diversity not only represents a challenge from an ethical, political
and corporate social responsibility perspective, but it is tied to efficiency which public
companies should pursue in the medium and long term. The Spanish Code of Good
Governance encourages firms with a low female presence to make an extra effort to search
for female candidates whenever a board position has to be renewed, so that women may
occupy top managerial positions and sit on boards of directors in listed corporations. 
Two of the recommendations suggested by this code stand out in particular: a) that the
selection procedure contains no implicit bias that might hinder the selection of female
board members; and b) that companies make a conscious effort to search for and to include
women who meet the requisite professional profiles. 
Additionally, the White Paper on Corporate Social Responsibility, passed in 2006, also
mentions diversity management among its recommendations. This White Paper considers
that the female presence is a way of enriching organisational culture and is a source of
competitive advantages. Subsequently, the Spanish Government passed the Effective
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Gender Equality Act in 2007, with the aim of promoting equal opportunities and equal
treatment, which legislated against gender discrimination in the labour market. 
For instance, this law requires companies with more than 250 employees to implement
equality plans in selection, professional promotion, training, rewards and compensation.
As regards the representation of women on boards of directors, this law stipulates that the
largest companies must attempt to include some women on their boards with a view to
reaching a balanced presence of males and females within eight years. This regulation sets
the criteria for the incorporation of board members in terms of talent and professional
performance, to ensure that gender will not be an adverse selection factor.
In previous studies, although Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008b) obtained a positive
effect on Tobin’s Q, the diversity of the Spanish board of directors does not appear to
influence corporate performance (Mateos, Escot and Gimeno, 2006; Jimeno and Redondo,
2007, 2008; Cóndor and Esteban, 2008; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008a). Unlike
these previous works, the scope of our research encompasses the influence of gender
diversity in top management positions, the impact of female stockholders with significant
stock ownership and the effect of female directors. Moreover, it analyses the impact on
many variables linked to corporate performance, such as accounting measures, market
value and efficiency, while controlling for corporate-governance features and correcting
simultaneous causality. 
In summary, this topic requires a broader approach in order to examine the influence of
gender diversity in greater depth.
GENDER DIVERSITY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE.
THEORIES AND PREVIOUS EVIDENCE
Among its objectives, corporate governance literature analyses different mechanisms to
improve the monitoring of managerial activities, so that stockholders’ interests can be
protected. For instance, more diverse boards as regards the origin and background of its
members can reduce earnings management practices and the probabilities of committing
frauds in financial statements (Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Peasnell, Pope and Young,
2005; García Osma and Gill-de-Albornoz, 2007). 
Currently, gender diversity is one of the most important governance issues facing
managers, directors, and stockholders and it is considered part of good corporate
governance. In this sense, Rose (2007) argues that corporations, like other organisations,
should reflect the disparity of society as a whole, and diversity on boards and in top
management is therefore a logical consequence. However, although gender diversity in
3
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corporate governance is desirable from the perspective of social cohesion and is an
increasingly visible trend in modern companies, from an economic perspective this
diversity should not be established per se, but should lead to an increase in corporate
value. Therefore, demand for gender diversity remains quite controversial, as it involves
important advantages and several drawbacks. Table 1 summarizes the main advantages
and drawbacks associated with gender diversity. Overall, diversity may lead to an
improvement in monitoring management, due to greater boardroom independence and
more complex and exhaustive decision-making processes. However, at the same time as
gender diversity increases creativity, more complexity in decision-making is generated,
which will imply potential conflicts and a lower degree of cohesion.
I. Gallego, I.M. García, L. Rodríguez
TABLE 1.- ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS DERIVED FROM GENDER DIVERSITY
ADVANTAGES DRAWBACKS
Promotes a better understanding of the marketplace,
thereby increasing its ability to penetrate markets
(Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003; Campbell and
Mínguez-Vera, 2008a)
Enhances creativity and innovation inside the
corporation
Leads to more effective problem-solving since a more
diverse board provides a wider variety of perspectives
and, consequently, a higher number of alternatives to
evaluate (Rose, 2007)
May improve the quality of the directors and managers
if they are selected from both genders without
prejudice (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008a)
May issue positive signals to markets –labour,
products and capital markets– by providing a greater
degree of legitimacy to corporations and improving
their reputations (Carter et al., 2007; Rose, 2007).
Implies heterogeneous teams, which tend to
communicate less frequently (Cox and Blacke, 1991;
Watson, Kumar and Michaelsen, 1993; Earley and
Mosakowski, 2000), are usually less cooperative and
experience more conflicts (Tajfel and Turner, 1985;
Williams and O’Reilly, 1998).
May lead to the generation of discrepancies and less
speed in the decision-making process, because the
leadership styles are different among males and
females (Litz and Folker, 2002, pp. 343-344; Fenwick
and Neal, 2001)
Can generate more opinions and critical questions
inside heterogeneous boards that can be more time-
consuming (Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003;
Smith, Smith and Verner, 2006)
This table depicts the main advantages and drawbacks related to gender diversity in companies, according to the
previous referenced studies.
Three well-established theories that refer to gender diversity and its implications should
be taken into account in any study of the association between performance and gender
diversity at different levels of decision-making in modern-day corporations: agency theory,
the resource dependence theory and the resource-based view of the firm. Agency theory
suggests that increased boardroom independence and better monitoring of managers will
ensue as a consequence of higher gender diversity; therefore, diversity may strengthen
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existing control mechanisms over executives and managers. This theory is more directly
linked to the presence of diversity on boards and stock ownership.
Meanwhile, the second and third theories are more easily applied to diversity in top
management. The resource dependence theory argues that diversity can be an instrument
for accessing resources that are critical to the firm’s success and can enhance its overall
problem-solving capacity, whereas the resource-based view focuses on the synergies
arising from the interaction of males and females and on diversity as a source of
competitive advantage. 
3.1. Gender diversity on board of directors 
Agency theory suggests that a more diverse board may entail better monitoring of
managers, because board diversity increases board independence (Randöy, Thomsen and
Oxelheim, 2006; Carter et al., 2007). For instance, directors of a different gender,
ethnicity or cultural background might ask questions that would not come from directors
with more conventional backgrounds (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008a; Jurkus, Park
and Woodard, 2007). Nonetheless, these minority members can be marginalized by
majority members and their suggestions may not be considered in the decision-making
process (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003). 
Moreover, board members of diverse gender or ethnic origin may better avoid practices of
earnings smoothing and management, thus providing shareholders with more reliable
figures for corporate performance. Moreover, diversity can lead to an increase in its
effectiveness, which can eventually lead to good performance, as a consequence of a wider
variety of perspectives and a more exhaustive decision-making process. 
In this line, previous literature has demonstrated the positive effects of gender diversity on
boards and on corporate performance. For instance, within US corporations, Adler (2001),
Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) and Adams and Ferreira (2004) find that the
proportion of women on boards of directors has a positive influence on corporate value -
measured by Tobin’s Q-, concluding that diversity is associated with greater financial
performance. Carter et al. (2007) stress this positive relationship, by underlining that
gender diversity has a positive effect on financial performance mainly through the Audit
function of the Board.
Other studies (Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003; Jurkus, Park and Woodard, 2007;
Krishnan and Park, 2005) have also analysed this impact on accounting measures, such as
margins and returns, showing the positive influence of diversity as a consequence of a
more effective monitoring function on boards. Along these lines, for example, Jurkus, Park
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and Woodard (2007) have shown that the positive relationship is especially significant in
industries with few women.
In contrast, several studies in the US reported that gender diversity had no impact as a
mechanism of corporate governance in terms of market and financial performance, given
that the drawbacks of gender diversity on boards can outweigh its advantages. The lack of
influence of gender diversity on performance is shown by using both measures of market
value (Richard, 2000; Kochan et al., 2003; Ellis and Keys, 2003; Farrell and Hersch,
2005), and accounting measures of performance (e.g. Shrader, Blackburn and Iles, 1997).
The scope of the analysis has also been extended beyond the US environment, reflecting
the same disparity found in the results. The positive impact of gender diversity on
financial performance has been shown, for instance, in Denmark (Smith, Smith and Verner,
2006). However, several studies carried out in Denmark (Randöy, Thomsen and Oxelheim,
2006; Rose, 2007), Sweden (Du Rietz and Henrekson, 2000; Randöy, Thomsen and
Oxelheim, 2006), Norway (Randöy, Thomsen and Oxelheim, 2006) and Spain (Jimeno and
Redondo, 2007; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008a) have found that the composition of
the board does not influence corporate performance. Moreover, certain negative effects of
diversity on performance have been reported in Norway (Böhren and Ström, 2005) and in
Denmark (Rose, 2004), and it was found that greater diversity can lead to a decrease in
boards’ effectiveness, which can give rise to a reduction in corporate value.
Taking the theoretical arguments into consideration and the previous empirical evidence,
we propose to test the following hypothesis:
H1:  The presence of a higher percentage of women on boards of directors exhibits a
positive and significant association with financial performance and corporate value.
3.2. Gender diversity in top management
The second theory -Resource Dependence Theory- views board diversity as one of the
instruments that management may use to facilitate access to resources that are critical to
the firm’s success (Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). Owing to the great complexity and
dynamism in the current business context, companies require an increasingly diverse work
force that will fit into the new business culture. Stiles (2001) specifically suggests that
board diversity might boost access to critical resources, which would suggest that
diversity, insofar as it relates to age, gender, and nationality, can have a positive impact on
performance. Group diversity could influence management tasks positively, if it were to
increase overall problem-solving capacity; at the same time, it is more likely to establish
interactions and external links with the environment and, as a result, to win crucial
resources for companies (Siciliano, 1996; Dalton et al., 1999). For example, a more diverse
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board could benefit from a greater understanding of its customers (Carter, Simkins and
Simpson, 2003) or other key stakeholders, and from a wider knowledge of the industry or
the choices of access to finance. Increased diversity will tap more information sources, but
at the expense of less decisiveness (Randöy, Thomsen and Oxelheim, 2006). Therefore, the
best performing work teams are highly likely to be linked to members that represent
variation in terms of experience, background and gender. Furthermore, a scarce presence
of females in top management could be regarded as discrimination that is both unethical
and suboptimal, because an unprejudiced selection enables companies to attract and
retain talent from a wider pool of human capital (Jimeno and Redondo, 2008). 
Related to the earlier theory, the resource-based view stresses that corporate performance
is strongly influenced by the physical, organisational and human resources that are
available to management which comply with several features (Barney, 1991); they must be
valuable, rare, have imperfect imitability, and no strategically equivalent substitutes.
Gender diversity and the balance between both genders can become a source of
competitive advantage (Watson, Kumar and Michaelsen, 1993; Shrader, Blackburn and
Iles, 1997; Farrell and Hersch, 2001), given that each gender contributes to management
in a different and complementary way. Social psychology has pointed out that while many
males may be predisposed towards leading in ways that emphasize competition, hierarchy,
rational problem-solving, high control, low emotionality, and a bias for analysis, many
females may conversely be predisposed to facilitating cooperation, team-based
accomplishment, intuitive problem-solving, lower levels of control and high levels of
emotionality (Litz and Folker, 2002, pp. 343-344; Fenwick and Neal, 2001). A more
diverse team in management and on boards is better equipped to observe opportunities and
threats on multiple fronts, and possesses a broader repertoire of skills and capabilities for
superior problem solving and decision making (Krishnan and Park, 2005). Hence, unique
and socially complex synergies may arise from the interaction of males and females that
would otherwise not be possible with only single-gender activity, so that it can be assumed
that firm performance may be positively related to more balanced gender representation in
firm management (Litz and Folker, 2002). 
While most studies focus on the diversity of boards of directors, which has a stronger link
with the Agency Theory’s arguments, a smaller number of works have analysed the impact
of diversity on top management and its influence on obtaining better corporate
performance. Whereas Kochan et al. (2003) do not find significant direct effects of
diversity on organisational performance, other studies (Krishnan and Park, 2005; Litz and
Folker, 2002; Shrader, Blackburn and Iles, 1997; Smith, Smith and Verner, 2006) have
found a positive influence on financial return.
Consequently, we propose the following hypothesis in relation to the presence of women in
top management:
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H2:  The presence of a higher percentage of women in top management exhibits a positive
and significant association with financial performance and corporate value.
3.3. Gender diversity in stockholders with significant ownership
According to Agency Theory, whereas ownership dispersion creates free-riding problems
and makes manager monitoring difficult, large shareholders have incentives to monitor
management and act as an additional control mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986;
Jensen, 1993), which has a positive repercussion on corporate performance. 
However, stockholders may also lead to a decrease in monitoring quality, as the
expropriation hypothesis suggests. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that in some countries
the agency problem stems from the conflict between controlling owners and minority
shareholders, instead of between managers and dispersed shareholders. In these cases,
large shareholdings are costly, because majority owners can redistribute wealth from other
minority shareholders, whose interests need not coincide. 
The question over whether female and male stockholders behave in the way has led to the
finding that women usually show more ethical awareness (Bernardi and Guptill, 2008).
Welch, Welch and Hewerdine (2008) demonstrated that female entrepreneurs showed a
higher degree of risk aversion than their male counterparts. Similarly, women prefer
longevity over fast company growth (Bird and Brusch, 2002), considering self-fulfilment
rather than profits as the main measure of their success (Weiler and Bernasek, 2001).
On the other hand, female stockholders with significant ownership obviously have strong
incentives to achieve the best corporate performances, in order to increase their own personal
wealth. Initially, Watkins and Watkins (1984), Fischer (1992) and Rosa, Carter and Hamilton
(1996) suggested that women entrepreneurs underperform in relation to men as measured by
conventional economic performance measures, mainly because of less training and corporate
experience, and supported the controversial hypothesis of ‘female underperformance’.
However, the findings of Carter and Shaw (2006) and Driga and Prior (2008) suggest that the
initial conditions of female-controlled businesses in size and finance explain this
underperformance. Consequently, it may not result from differences in the managerial ability
of women and men, but it could be the result of different levels of start-up resources. 
Other studies (Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991; Johnson and Storey, 1993; Du Rietz and
Henrekson, 2000) have not found any differences between genders. For instance, in their
analysis of 300 firms in three industrial sectors in the US, Kalleberg and Leicht (1991)
show that small companies managed by women were more orientated towards quality
strategies and reached success levels similar to those managed by men. Du Rietz and
Henrekson (2000) found that, on aggregate, female entrepreneurs tend to underperform in
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relation to men; however, their subsequent and disaggregated analysis revealed that there
are no consistent differences in the returns they generate.
Consequently, our final hypothesis relates to the presence of women in stock ownership:
H3:  The presence of female stockholders with significant ownership exhibits a significant
association with financial performance and corporate value.
METHODOLOGY
4.1. Analysis technique and variables
Several dependence models based on linear panel data regressions were selected as the
analytical technique to test the proposed hypotheses. More specifically, the models were
estimated through fixed and random effects, by checking the validity of both models using
the Hausman test.
The fixed effects model allows us to ignore the information related to those latent fixed
effects, which are highly correlated with the variables included in the model, and provides
us with consistent estimators. 
The random effects model is more appropriate when there is no correlation between the
fixed effects and the model variables, and it enables us to obtain more efficient
coefficients; furthermore, it assumes that the variables are non-random and are not
correlated with the explanatory variables.
The Hausman test checks the null hypothesis of absence of correlation between the
individual effects and the independent variables; when not rejected, the higher degree of
efficiency in the estimation leads to the use of the random effects model.
More specifically, the models are expressed as follows:
CPit = b0 +b1ALLWOMit + ∑b2 Yit +eit [1]
CPit =b0 +b1FEMSTit +b2FEMDIRit +b3FEMMNGit +b4Yit +eit  [2]
where,
i indicates the company and t refers to the time period, 
CP reflects the different measures of corporate performance,
ALLWOM, FEMST, FEMDIR and FEMMNG are the independent variables, representing
gender diversity in companies, b is, in each case, the parameter to be estimated 
4
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Y reflects a vector of other explanatory variables, defined as control variables, e is a
random error term. 
In addition, in order to correct simultaneous causality between independent variables and
corporate performance, the models were run again with instrumental variables, using as
instruments the lagged variables employed to represent gender diversity.
The variables selected for our analysis are shown in Table 2. We proposed seven
alternative measures concerning the dependent variable. The first six variables relate to
corporate performance indicators, which have been widely used in previous studies, such
as Tobin’s Q (e.g. Carter, Simkins and Simpson., 2003; Rose, 2007) and several accounting
ratios -ROA, ROE, ROS, net ROA and gross margin- (e.g. Smith, Smith and Verner, 2006;
Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003). The last dependent variable proposed -efficiency-
may be considered a novel development.
I. Gallego, I.M. García, L. Rodríguez
TABLE 2.- DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY OF THE VARIABLES
Variables Definition Typology
Q  Ratio between market value and assets for a company, 
defined according to Carter et al. (2007)’s specifications Numeric
ROA Return on assets, ratio of operating income to net assets  Numeric
ROE Return on equity, ratio of operating income to stockholders’ equity Numeric
ROS Return on sales, ratio between operating income and net sales Numeric
ROAN Net return on assets, ratio between net income and net assets Numeric
MUB Ratio of gross margin to net sales Numeric
EFFICIENCY Obtained from estimating the parametric frontier function, 
proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992), by using sales as the output, 
and number of employees and depreciation of assets during the current 
year as the inputs. Numeric
ALLWOM Sum of the variables FEMST, FEMDIR and FEMMNG Numeric
FEMST Proportion of women with significant stock ownership 
(higher than 5 per cent)  Numeric
FEMDIR Proportion of women on the board of directors Numeric
FEMMNG Proportion of top managers which are females Numeric
CRPSIZE Corporate size measured by the logarithm of total assets Numeric
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Corporate efficiency is considered, because it is one of the most precise techniques for
measuring company performance, according to Hill and Snell (1989). It decreases the
problems associated with Tobin’s Q and financial ratios, such as extreme sensitivity to the
use of different accounting methods or earnings smoothing (Barth, Gulbrandsen and
Schone, 2005).
Efficiency was calculated through the estimation of a stochastic frontier function for panel
data, proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992):
Yit = xitß + (Vit –Uit),    i= 1, …, 96      t=1, ….3
where
Y is the logarithm of sales for company i in period t as a production output, 
xit is a vector of inputs used to obtain the output; in our estimation, the inputs encompass
the number of employees and the depreciation of assets during the current year, as
variables representing workforce utilisation and fixed investments,
ß is the vector of unknown parameters,
Vit are random variables, which are assumed to be independent and equally distributed
[N(0,sv
2)] and independent of Uit,
Uit is a random non-negative variable which is adopted as the measure of technical
efficiency and is independent and equally distributed [N(0,su
2)].
As for the independent variables, we have selected three variables representing the female
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Variables Definition Typology
BRDSIZE Number of members in the board of directors Numeric
CEODUALITY Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the CEO also holds 
the position of Chairman of the Board and the value 0 otherwise Dichotomic
MEETING Number of annual meetings of the board of directors Numeric
OUTSDIRECT Proportion of outside directors on the board of directors Numeric
IBEX35 Dummy variable which takes the value of either 1 if the company 
is listed on the IBEX-35 index, or 0 if otherwise Dichotomic
LEV Leverage, ratio of total debt to total assets Numeric
DBTCT Debt costs: interests from external debt Numeric
SLSGRW Sales growth: variation of sales from the prior period Numeric
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presence in stock ownership, on the board of directors and in top management, and another
variable – a substitute for the other variables- which involves the overall consideration of
gender diversity in each company.
Finally, as control variables, we included four indicators of the three most relevant features of
the main monitoring body, whose impact has been evidenced in previous studies, which are size
(e.g. Yermack, 1996; Andrés, Azofra and López, 2005), activity (e.g. Vafeas, 1999),
independence of the board of directors (e.g. Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Bozec and Dia, 2007), and
a corporate size-related variable. Furthermore, we incorporated sales growth in the model, in
order to identify growth trends in the company under analysis, as well as two variables linked to
mechanisms for reducing the agency costs of external funds –leverage and debt cost– given that
debt usually plays a disciplinary role and that a higher debt cost increases the level of control
exerted by external financing such as that carried out by banks (Grinstein, 2006; Saona and
Vallelado, 2007). The dummy IBEX35 reflects the most important Spanish companies.
When Tobin’s Q is used as the dependent variable, the control variable ROA is
additionally introduced because of its potential impact on the dependent variable (e.g.
Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003).
In addition, all the models include annual and industry dummies to control for temporal
and activity effects.
4.2. Sample description 
As our objective population we selected those Spanish corporations which are listed on the
Madrid Stock Exchange and whose information on corporate governance is available on the
CNMV (Securities Markets Commission) database, in order to test the hypotheses. The
Spanish context is especially interesting and worthy of analysis, given the low female
presence on boards and in management positions at present and the increasing political
pressure to encourage the participation of women in corporations. 
We removed those companies which operate in financial and insurance industries from the
population; consequently, our final sample was made up of 117 firms from different
activity sectors.
This sample was selected for several reasons. Firstly, we are dealing with a set of the largest
Spanish companies, the most significant ones trading in the Spanish Stock Market, which is
particularly active nowadays. The largest companies are under more political pressure to
comply with the minimum requirements of gender parity, so that the incorporation of a higher
or lower number of women is likely to reflect a conscious choice. They are the main focus of
the recent Spanish legislation, which aims to increase the role played by females in public
I. Gallego, I.M. García, L. Rodríguez
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corporations, especially large-sized companies. Therefore, a study of this sample allows us to
reach conclusions on a set of the most visible Spanish corporations, which have special
incentives to implement a gender strategy on the inclusion and promotion of women to top
corporate positions, which may be a useful model for other companies.
After the sample selection, all available information on corporate governance was gathered
from the annual reports that the companies are obliged to deposit in the CNMV. The time
period under analysis was 2004-2006. The information on corporate governance is available
in a format called Modelo de información sobre la asunción del Código de buen gobierno. This
information meant that our initial sample was reduced to 96 companies, which involved the
analysis of 288 observations using financial data obtained from the AMADEUS Database.
RESULTS
5.1. Descriptive statistics, correlations and tests of differences between means
Table 3 (Panel A) shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. In line with other studies,
these statistics reflect the low female presence in the largest Spanish companies. The total
number of women in mainstream corporate positions reaches an average of 1 woman per
company (a median of 1.00 woman), ranging from 0 to 4. Women usually hold positions
firstly in top management (0 on average, with a maximum of 5 women) and then on the
Board of Directors (0 on average, with a maximum of 4 women). The presence of female
stockholders with significant participation is even more limited. The proportion of female
directors on boards is 4.12 percent, ranging from no presence to a third of the board. 
Furthermore, by analysing Q1, the Median and Q3, it can be observed that the distribution
of female presence shows a significant degree of inequality, since the last 25 per cent of
the companies analysed contains most of the women. Therefore, this sample, which groups
the most significant Spanish companies in the stock market, reflects a rather unequal and
anecdotal female presence in the Spanish business context. 
This degree of female presence on boards, in line with many European countries like Belgium
(3%), Italy (2%) and Portugal (a mere 0.7%), remains low. It is especially striking when
compared with female representation in other countries, such as the USA and Scandinavia:
female representation is 22% in Norway, 21% in Sweden and 14% in Finland. Meanwhile,
other countries in the European Union, such as the UK, Germany and France, fall into an
intermediate range of between 5 and 10% (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008).
It is worth emphasizing that Norway is one of the most advanced countries with regard to
gender equality; in fact, since 2006 the representation of each gender on boards of
5
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directors must reach at least 40% in this country. In Finland, the age and proportionality
of both genders must be taken into consideration in the composition of the board, and in
Sweden, legislation ensures gender equality in the composition of the board (Carrasco
Gallego and Laffarga Briones, 2006).
The percentage of women in top management is quite reduced in relation to the 7.3 per
cent found by De Luis et al. (2008), based on 9,875 managerial positions in the largest
2,000 Spanish companies.
Concerning the remaining variables, there is wide dispersion in the size of the companies
under study (from 15,929,000 to 23,060,000,000 Euros in total assets); they are mature
companies with stability in sales growth. Tobin’s Qs do not reach high values, whereas
profitability figures are –on average– 16.97 per cent and 6.7 per cent for Return on Equity
(ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA), respectively (medians: 11.47 per cent and 4.87 per
cent). The margins show an average of 38.34 per cent.
Regarding the variables related to corporate governance, boards are composed of 11
members, ranging from 3 to 21 members, who meet 8-9 times a year. In 59 per cent of the
boards, the CEO also holds the position of chair (CEO duality). And, finally, there is a
majority of non-executive directors (75.12 per cent, on average, which includes
institutional directors; i.e. not all of those 75% are independent directors).
Panel B of Table 3 reflects the female presence by different activity sectors. The highest
global female presence is shown in the services and real estate sectors, in which their
average presence reaches figures of 2 and 1 women per company, respectively. The
interval of presence reaches a maximum of five women. In those sectors, the highest
female presence is found on boards, where it reaches a fourth or a third of their members.
Technology and telecommunication activities also report a high degree of female presence
in our sample, both in the total number and in the number of female managers. The lowest
presence is in the petroleum and energy sector, in which the proportion of female directors
is just 1 per cent. Moreover, the basic materials sector contains the most visible overall
fluctuation in women (from 0 to 8), in female directors (0-4), in the proportion of female
directors (0.00-0.33), in female managers (0-5) and in female stockholders (0-4). 
Table 4 shows the bivariate correlations among the variables used in the analysis. Firstly,
the variables reflecting female presence strongly correlate between each other; for
instance, the correlations reach a figure of 0.733 between the female presence on boards
and the total number of women in mainstream corporate positions, 0.687 between female
stockholders and the total number of women, 0.613 between female managers and the total
number of women, and 0.603 between female stockholders and female directors. So the
I. Gallego, I.M. García, L. Rodríguez
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presence of women directors is more likely in firms that have more women entrepreneurs.
On the contrary, there is no significant correlation between female stockholders and female
managers (-0.010). Therefore, those companies that have females in any position of
corporate governance are very likely to have women in other relevant positions. 
The highest correlations between the dependent and the independent variables are
observed for FEMMNG with IBEX35 (0.277), for FEMST and ROAN (-0.179) and for
ALLWOM and EFFICIENC (0.178). 
Finally, there appears to be a strong relationship between membership in the IBEX-35
index and BRDSIZE (0.540), and CRPSIZE (0.454). In addition, other large correlations
are given between DBTCT and MEETINGS (0.493) and SLSGRW and ROS (0.426). 
Table 5 displays the results obtained after performing some tests of differences between
means in corporate performance and corporate governance. Thus, we broke up the
sample into two subsamples, on the basis of whether there is female presence or female
absence in corporations, the reference variable being ‘overall women’. If the company
did not report a positive figure in ‘overall women’ it was assigned to the subsample
‘Absence’, and conversely it was assigned to ‘Presence’ if it reported a positive figure
1
.
After allocating the companies to their respective subsamples, we applied some non-
parametric tests (Mann-Whitney’s U and Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s Z), the results of which
are presented in Table 5.
The tests showed that organizations with a female presence in their mainstream corporate
positions tended to report the lowest figures for corporate performance, such as ROA (5.95
opposed to 7.30 per cent), ROE (12.28 opposed to 18.29 per cent) or Tobin’s Q (0.50 as
opposed to 0.55); on the contrary, sales growth and margins are larger in the subsample
containing companies with a female presence. However, Mann-Whitney tests do not detect
significant differences, whereas Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s Z is marginally significant for
ROA, sales growth and margin. Consequently, considered overall, from a univariate
perspective, differences in corporate performance as a function of female presence /
absence cannot be stated. 
Furthermore, there do not seem to be differences in corporate governance variables
between companies with female absence / presence; their boards present a similar number
of directors and a similar proportion of non-executive members and are just as frequently
convened. 
The influence of gender diversity on corporate performance
(1) The results remain unchanged when the median of the variable ‘overall women’ is used, instead of the split described
(not reported). 
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TABLE 5.- TESTS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEANS
Subsample Mean Mann-Whitney’s U KS’s Z
Corporate Size Absence 3153654.370 9239 0.943
Presence 1734643.810
ROA Absence 7.303 9531 1.391**
Presence 5.954
ROAN Absence 0.383 8688 0.801
Presence 0.418
Sales Growth Absence 6.39e-04 8466 1.540**
Presence 0.001
ROE Absence 18.297 8552 1.194
Presence 12.287
Tobin’s Q Absence 0.560 7642 0.848
Presence 0.509
Gross Margin Absence 0.212 5969 1.232*
Presence 0.563
Efficiency Absence 0.315 6683 1.554**
Presence 0.445
ROS Absence 0.178 7745 1.080
Presence 0.232
Board members Absence 11.160 7997.500 0.603
Presence 10.600
Duality Absence 0.560 7901.500 0.507
Presence 0.620
Meetings Absence 9.510 7.423 1.188
Presence 8.460
% outside directors Absence 0.748 7989.500 0.922
Presence 0.754
The sample is broken up into two subsamples: Absence (there is female absence in the company analysed, i.e. overall
women = 0) and Presence (there is female presence in the company analysed, i.e. overall women > 0). 
Variables as defined in tables 2 and 3.
The third column reflects the mean of the variable for both subsamples.
The fourth and fifth columns contain the non-parametric Mann-Whitney’s U and Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s Z tests of
differences in means. Significant tests are in bold. 
(**) significant at 0.05 per cent
(*) significant at 0.10 per cent
Subsamples’ means and non-parametric tests
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5.2. Coefficients obtained for fixed and random effects models
Table 6 displays the estimations for the fixed effects and random effects model, as well as
the Hausman test for the significance of random effects. This test does not allow us to
reject the hypothesis of absence of correlation between individual effects and independent
variables. Consequently, the estimation with the random effects model is the most efficient
one for the variables Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, Gross Margin and Efficiency. For the model
which explains the dependent variables ROS and Net-ROA, the fixed effects models are
more suitable than the random effects models. No multicollinearity problems were
registered after measuring the variance inflation factors. 
As regards the significance of the variables, the variable ALLWOM, reflecting the total
proportion of women in the main corporate bodies involved in the decision-making process,
shows a significant and negative effect on the dependent variables ROA, ROS and ROE at
a confidence level ranging from 90% (0.05<p-value < 0.1) to 99% (p-value < 0.01). There
is no significant impact on the remaining variables.
The variable FEMDIR, which indicates the proportion of female directors on the board,
shows a positive and significant impact on Tobin’s Q (confidence level of 95%) and ROAN,
at a confidence level of 99%. No significant effects on the other variables were detected. 
Regarding the variable FEMMNG –percentage of female managers in top management- the
results evince little or no significant impact of gender diversity on the variables of
corporate performance. 
The variable FEMST, which represents the proportion of female stockholders with
significant stock ownership, shows a negative association with ROAN (statistically
significant at a confidence level of 99%). There are no significant effects on the remaining
variables related to corporate performance.
Models estimated with instrumental variables were used in order to correct potential
problems of simultaneous causality between dependent and independent variables. Table 7
summarizes the coefficients of the variables that reflect gender diversity.
The results confirm above-mentioned inverse relationship for the independent variable
ALLWOM and the dependent variables ROA, ROE and ROS. When the variable ALLWOM
was disaggregated into the variables defining the female presence in top management,
boards and stock ownership, no significant relationship was detected between those
variables and corporate performance, thereby suggesting that gender diversity does not
significantly influence many of the corporate performance-related variables. Considered
overall, the absence of any significant impact is stressed, given that most of the variables
analysed do not appear to reflect a significant effect of female presence.
I. Gallego, I.M. García, L. Rodríguez
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Concerning the remaining variables, in the models without instrumental variables, MEETINGS
displays an inverse relationship with ROA and ROE and a direct relationship with ROAN; the
relationships with the other variables are not statistically significant. DUALITY evinces an
inverse relationship with ROA, as does OUTSDIRECT with ROAN. CRPSIZE is directly linked
to corporate efficiency. The IBEX-35 shows mixed findings, with a direct relationship with ROA
and ROE, an inverse relationship with GRMARG, and a non-significant relationship with Tobin’s
Q, ROS and ROAN. LEV has a negative association with ROA and ROS (ROAN in the model
developed in Panel B), and a positive association with Tobin’s Q. The remaining variables are not
significant. DBTCT exhibits a positive association with ROA and ROE. SLSGRW has a negative
association with GRMARG; additionally, it displays a positive association with Tobin’s Q in both
panels and with ROAN in the model developed in Panel B.
On the other hand, when analysing the coefficients for independent variables in those linear
models estimated with instrumental variables, many coefficients change to non-significant,
especially in the model with disaggregated variables (Panel B), thus revealing the importance
of the effects that arise from simultaneous causality among the variables under analysis. 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Table 8 depicts the findings obtained for each variable, showing the impact of a female
presence and its nature. 
6
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TABLE 8.- SUMMARY OF FINDINGS. 
NATURE OF THE IMPACT OF FEMALE PRESENCE ON PERFORMANCE
IMPACT OVERALL  Women on Women in Top  Women with significant
WOMEN Board of Directors
a Management
a stock ownership
a
+ Net ROA 
Tobin’s Q
- ROA Net ROA
ROE
ROS
N/S Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROA
Net ROA Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q
Gross Margin ROE ROE ROE
Efficiency ROS ROS ROS
Gross Net ROA Gross Margin 
Margin Gross Margin Efficiency
Efficiency Efficiency
a
Non significant results when instrumental variables are used
This table summarizes the findings obtained about the influence of gender diversity on corporate performance and
market value, by differentiating the field of gender diversity analysed: overall women, women on boards of directors,
women in top management and women with significant stock ownership. 
The first / second / third rows reflect on which variables of corporate performance there is a positive / negative / non-
significant influence, by different scopes of gender diversity.
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Considered overall, the results show a non-significant or a rather negative influence of female
presence on corporate performance. There is a prevalence of non-significant results, given
that most variables display a non-significant influence. In addition, the negative influence on
certain variables could be considered as anecdotal and erratic, given their scarce number and
the fact that it may be difficult to assume a non-significant influence on some variables and a
negative effect on other variables when they are closely related. 
More specifically, we have verified that the overall presence of a higher number of women
in the main corporate decision-making bodies leads to a non-significant effect on most
variables related to corporate performance. Moreover, it does not affect the technical
efficiency of the production process. We also see a decrease in corporate returns, mainly
return on assets, return on equity and return on sales. These findings would be consistent
with Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999), who demonstrated that companies with weaker
governance structures (for instance, due to a higher diversity that reduces effectiveness)
show greater agency problems and worse performance. 
The presence of female directors on boards has a mainly non-significant effect on
corporate performance. It shows a positive direction in net return on assets and Tobin’s Q,
but this disappears after controlling for simultaneous causality. The female presence does
not seem to influence the remaining variables significantly. Consequently, it is not possible
to uphold hypothesis 1. This finding is in accordance with previous research. Although
Smith, Smith and Verner (2006) and Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) obtain a positive
influence on corporate return, Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997), Randöy, Thomsen and
Oxelheim (2006) and Jimeno and Redondo (2007) conclude that there is an absence of
effect. This lack of effect is also found in Rose (2007) -for Denmark-, Böhren and Ström
(2005) -for Norway- and Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) -for Spain-, who use Tobin’s
Q as a proxy of corporate performance. 
Concerning the female presence in top management, we too obtained a predominant non-
significant relationship with corporate performance, market value and efficiency, leading
us to reject hypothesis 2. These findings add to the lack of consensus shown in previous
empirical evidence. For instance, while Krishnan and Park (2005) and Jurkus, Park and
Woodard (2007) conclude a positive relationship between the female presence in top
management and return on assets for the USA, Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997) contend
that this relationship is not significant for many indicators of corporate performance. In
addition, Smith, Smith and Verner (2006) only showed a positive influence on net return
on assets of those women holding mainstream managerial positions in Danish corporations.
The presence of female stockholders with significant stock ownership is not related to most
of the variables corresponding to corporate returns. It is just inversely associated with net
return on assets in the overall model (Table 6, Panel A); these effects disappear when the
simultaneous causality is controlled for, such that neither is hypothesis 3 upheld. 
I. Gallego, I.M. García, L. Rodríguez
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In this sense, previous studies, such as those by Fischer, Reuber and Dyke (1993) -for
Canada-, Cooper, Gimeno-Gascón and Woo (1994) and Fasci and Valdez (1998) -for the
USA-, Rosa, Carter and Hamilton (1996) and Chell and Baines (1998) –for the UK-, Du
Rietz and Henrekson (2000) -for Sweden- and Watson and Robinson (2003) -for Australia-
evidenced a negative or a null association between the presence of female entrepreneurs
and corporate growth and performance and, even, the survival of companies owned by
them (Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991; Carter et al., 1997; Boden and Nucci, 2000).
Furthermore, Spanish corporations are distinguished by the strong presence of majority
stockholders with significant influence on management (LaPorta, López-de-Silanes and
Shleifer, 1999), which indirectly could imply that the participation of females in stock
ownership may be a consequence –in some cases– of their family links, rather than a
personal interest in being entrepreneurs. 
As for the remaining variables, some relationships stand out, such as the positive effect
of leverage on Tobin’s Q and the inverse association with ROA and ROS, and the positive
association of the debt cost with many variables of corporate performance. The direct
relationship between leverage and Tobin’s Q is consistent with McConnell and Servaes
(1995), who find that leverage is negatively related to Tobin’s Q for high-growth firms
and positively related to Tobin’s Q for low-growth firms, as shown by the companies
analysed in the variable ‘sales growth’. In addition, leverage plays a significant
disciplinary role (Grinstein, 2006), leading managers to operate more in favour of
stockholders’ interests, providing a positive relationship with variables of corporate
performance.  Furthermore, a higher debt cost increases the discipline related to
external financing, given greater control exercised by the banking sector and other
external financing entities
CONCLUSIONS
The composition of boards of directors is attracting greater attention, as a consequence of
its impact on board independence and on the monitoring of managers. Among the different
issues analysed in the composition of boards of directors, gender diversity particularly
stands out because it can become a competitive advantage and a source of corporate value.
Labour complementarities between men and women and the new perspectives which
diversity can provide in the decision-making processes can lead to a broader knowledge
base, creativity and innovation. Therefore, a more diverse work team will be better enabled
to prepare for more appropriate decisions and problem solving.
Nevertheless, diversity also implies a potential source of conflicts, as well as a slow
decision-making process, which could be especially negative in competitive environments
where the speed in making decisions may be crucial. 
7
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Empirical evidence is not sufficiently conclusive as regards the impact of gender diversity
in corporate governance on financial performance and corporate value, an absence of
direct effect over several return measures often being obtained.
In an extension of previous studies, the present work has analysed the effect of the
presence of female stockholders, directors and top managers on corporate performance,
measured by several accounting ratios, market value and technical efficiency. Its scope is
wider, both with regard to the female presence under analysis and the range of variables
on which the effect of female presence is studied, in comparison with other studies. In
addition, the geographic context of the study –Spain– provides an interesting context,
given that this country has evolved from having one of the lowest rates of female presence
in corporations in Europe to increasing political pressure to strengthen enhance that
presence. Consequently, the findings are especially significant in the current normative
context, in which an attempt is being made to reach labour parity between both genders. 
Our empirical analysis –based on tests of differences between means and some linear
panel data regressions– has shown a non-significant effect and sometimes a negative
influence of overall female presence on boards, in top management positions and in stock
ownership. Most of the effects of female presence lead to non-significant relationships with
corporate performance, market value and efficiency. Therefore, there do not appear to be
any differences in corporate performance from the perspective of gender diversity. This
kind of diversity in mainstream corporate positions does not necessarily lead to greater
corporate performance, so that companies with higher levels of gender diversity will not
clearly obtain better performance as defined by several market and accounting measures.
Therefore, gender diversity may not influence corporate performance. Consequently, the
requirements of increasing gender diversity may not necessarily be derived from
performance drivers –since there does not seem to be a direct influence– but these
requirements should rely more on factors of a sociological nature. 
This study, as well as the research methodology within which it is framed, show several
drawbacks which should be underscored. Firstly, there could be simultaneous effects of
other variables –age, culture, education, training, directors’ and managers’ previous
background and experience, corporate social responsibility, other relevant aspects of
diversity, etc. – which are not explicitly considered in models, given that they are
particularly difficult to measure. However, they can influence the relationship between
diversity and performance. We should also bear in mind that a female presence is one
aspect of diversity, but there are other factors that can be also relevant. 
Secondly, this methodology should be complemented by other type of analyses, such as
case studies or surveys, which can provide researchers with basic and primary information
on the evolution of gender diversity in companies and its influence on them. Moreover,
although the sample under analysis is a relevant one that contains the largest Spanish
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companies, which show a growing concern and interest in gender diversity, its size is in
itself a limitation, given the small number of companies available. Thirdly, there is a
scarce presence of females in the largest Spanish companies, thus leading to a low number
of women in our sample. Given that Spanish boards show low rates of female presence
(although this will foreseeably change in the future, as companies meet the requirements
of the recent legislation), it would appear appropriate to carry out further studies in some
years time, when boards will presumably be more diverse. 
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